Eric Crawford

House Intelligence Committee Passes FY2027 Intelligence Authorization Act Out of Committee - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Skip to Main July 20, 2026 House Intelligence Committee Passes FY2027 Intelligence Authorization Act Out of Committee WASHINGTON, D.C— Today, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed the fiscal year 2027 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) out of Committee. “This year’s IAA balances strong transparency and accountability measures while equipping the IC with the resources needed to combat the ever-evolving threats from our adversaries around the world, with a particularly strong focus on the global AI race,” said Chairman Crawford. “This Committee has a heightened responsibility to conduct rigorous oversight of the IC that the American people can trust because of the concealed nature of the IC’s work, which is conducted outside of the public sphere. We must constantly be questioning the status quo. Just because this is the ‘way it’s always been’ doesn’t mean that’s the way it should remain. I am very proud of the work the Committee did in this year’s IAA.” Notably, the FY2027 IAA includes measures to: Address waste, fraud, and abuse in the IC’s classified budgets, as evidenced by the David Rush case, by prohibiting the IC from concealing financial information from the Congressional intelligence committees. Place a greater emphasis on advancing the IC’s capabilities, coordination, and safety related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) by significantly increasing funding for expanded access and use of frontier AI models for intelligence and cyber missions. Designate a Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer for the IC to coordinate and strategize across the intelligence enterprise. Codify and expand the role of NSA’s Artificial Intelligence Security Center. Strengthen requirements for greater information sharing on AI threats and safety. Provide the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) with critical law enforcement authorities to more effectively carry out its oversight mission to identify fraud, waste, and mismanagement across the IC. Continue iterative progress to address the failures of the U.S. counterintelligence posture to deter, detect, and disrupt threats proactively from foreign intelligence services operating in the U.S. homeland. Improve, optimize, and enhance the nation’s CI workforce through training, resourcing, and re-evaluating existing CI programs for effectiveness. Enhance the IC’s discoverability and disruption capabilities for foreign intelligence threat actors and activities that threaten U.S. national security. Improve partner engagement and threat intelligence sharing by augmenting NCSC’s relationship with State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) partners and role in threat information sharing and evaluating shortfalls in reportable CI information Enforce budget accountability measures around how the FBI accounts for its counterterrorism and counterintelligence missions, providing transparency into how the FBI is spending taxpayer dollars on each mission set. Counter the aggressive encroachment by key adversaries, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Russia, and Iran, on U.S. national security by: Prohibiting any NIP funding from going to the National Labs unless the labs deny entry to any foreign individual from a country of concern, such as Russia, China, and Iran. Imposing a 10-year restriction on certain former IC officials from representing foreign adversary-linked entities before the U.S. government. Prohibiting intelligence community funding to universities with ties to specified PRC-linked entities. Requiring the IC to publish a classified and unclassified list of any entities associated with the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which is responsible for coordinating domestic and foreign influence operations to neutralize opposition and co-opt overseas Chinese communities, foreign actors, and governments in support of Bei